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ABSTRACT
This study examines the motivation behind contracts and vertical integration in the pork
industry, and simulates the effects of potential improvements in coordination. Incentives
related to lowering costs of measuring and sorting hogs, and protecting against opportu-
nistic behavior associated with specific assets, can result in hog quality improvements. A
framework for simulating the effects of increased coordination through contracts and ver-
tical integration was developed and used to evaluate potential improvements in leanness.
Although simulations suggest only modest changes in pork prices and supplies, gains in
consumers’ surplus could be substantial for larger demand shifts due to quality improve-
ments.
Key Words: contracts, hogs, lean pork, simulation model, vertical coordination, vertical
integration.
Significant changes underway in the pork in-
dustry illustrate the industrialization of agri-
culture (Hurt; Boehlje; Rhodes). The trend to-
ward larger, more specialized hog production
and processing operations is accelerating
(Hurt). Potential size economies and new
health-enhancing technologies encourage
greater concentration of animals. Changing
methods of vertical coordination in the pork
industry are also evident. The proportion of
slaughter hogs obtained by large packers
through long-term contracts or integrated op-
Martinez is an agricultural economist with the Eco-
nomic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture. Smith is a Ph.D. candidate and Zering is an as-
sociate professor/extension specialist, both at North
Carolina StateUniversity.
The authorswould like to thank an anonymous re-
viewer for many helpful comments. Support for this
research was provided by the U.S. Departmentof Ag-
riculture under Agreement No. 43-3AEM-5-80122.
The views expressed here are those of the authors and
do not necessarily representthose of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture.
erations is expected to increase from approx-
imately 1370 in 1993 to 3470 in 1998 (Hay-
enga et al.).
Greater use of contracting and integration
has led to complaints by smaller hog produc-
ers and packers about market power. Market
power through price discrimination, or barriers
to entry, may result in welfare losses to society
because of misallocated resources. Contracting
and integration also reduce the amount and ac-
curacy of publicly available market informa-
tion, which may distort production and mar-
keting decisions of producers.
However, contracting and integration may
also result in improved food quality for con-
sumers. As households have become smaller
and the value of their time has increased, con-
sumers place a greater value on convenience
and quality assurances in their food purchases.
Information linking diet to health has in-
creased consumer interest in the nutritional
quality of food products. Trends toward more
away-from-home food consumption and in-302 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1998
creased sales by large restaurant chains indi-
cate that food suppliers must be able to pro-
vide large amounts of consistently high
quality, uniform products. Pork producers and
processors also are introducing branded prod-
ucts, thereby increasing the need for quality
control. Contractual arrangements and vertical
integration presumably are leading to a highly
coordinated pork marketing system which is
more responsive to consumer preferences. In
a 1993 survey, large packers ranked ‘‘im-
proved quality” as the most important reason
for market contracts (Hayenga et al.). By tying
premiums and discounts paid to the quality of
hogs produced, or by directly controlling qual-
ity, packers may receive a more consistent
supply of high quality hogs. Hence, it is im-
portant to consider benefits of changing co-
ordinating arrangements, as well as potential
harmful effects related to market power.
Unfortunately, there is very little empirical
work that examines the market effects of
changing methods of vertical coordination. 1
Yet, limited empirical evidence suggests that
these effects could be substantial. For exam-
ple, Kinnucan and Nelson use a farm-retail
price margin model of the egg industry to ex-
amine the effect of increased vertical control
on marketing costs. They estimated that con-
tract production reduced egg marketing costs
by 25% between 1973 and 1983. In a com-
petitive egg marketing system, this translates
into lower egg prices on retail shelves for a
given level of demand. Similar results have
been documented for nonfood industries as
well. Kwoka estimated that vertical integration
of the generation and distribution stages of the
U.S. electric utility industry led to cost savings
of 27?i0. Hence, consumers and producers have
an interest in the type of coordinating arrange-
ments that develop.
In this analysis, we focus on the reduction
of transactions costs associated with quality
improvements as incentives for contracts or
vertical integration between hog producers and
~Formal empiricalmodeling of non-spot coordi-
nating arrangementshas focused on higher profits as
incentives for vertical integration of imperfectly com-
petitive stages (e.g., Azzam; Azzam and Wellman).
packers. We present a modeling framework for
simulating the impact on the pork industry of
a hog market characterized by a combination
of open market exchange, contract coordina-
tion, and vertical integration. We then evaluate
the potential effects of quality enhancements
(i.e., increased leanness) via contracts and ver-
tical integration.
Motivating Forces for Changes in
Coordination Between Producers and
Packers
We focus on transactional economies as mo-
tivation for contracts and vertical integration,
specifically those that relate to improvements
in quality. Transactions costs are expenses as-
sociated with carrying out transactions, such
as measuring performance, creating incen-
tives, and enforcing agreements to ensure de-
sired performance. Transactions cost theory
suggests that economic activity is organized to
minimize these costs (Milgrom and Roberts).
Hence, the move to contracting or vertical in-
tegration may be occurring to reduce the costs
of trading on the open market. By reducing
transactions costs associated with obtaining
higher quality hogs, the quality of hogs may
be improved.
Measuring and Sorting Costs
One way that non-spot coordinating arrange-
ments can improve the quality of hogs slaugh-
tered is by reducing transactions costs asso-
ciated with asymmetric information and
monitoring between packers and producers. A
buyer of an intermediate product (input) may
have difficulty in assessing the quality of the
product. For example, the PSE (pale, soft, ex-
udative) pork quality problem in some pork
carcasses is not easy to identify in carcasses
at the time of grading. Barzel argues that to
judge the value of a good, its attributes must
be measured. The cost of measuring these at-
tributes may be expensive and mistakes in
measurement may result in wealth transfers. In
addition, if there exists some variability in de-
sirable attributes of the intermediate product,
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value. The total cost of the good to the buyer
is the price paid plus the cost of attribute mea-
surement. If the quality attributes can be con-
trolled in the production process, the buyer of
an intermediate product may reduce the costs
of measuring and sorting by using new meth-
ods of coordination with the producer.
In the pork industry, the characteristics of
the hogs used by the packer and processor can
have an important influence on production
costs and the value of the final output pro-
duced. These characteristics include leanness,
PSE, and hog size. For example, Forrest found
a 53$ZO lean hog to be worth approximately $13
more than a 45~o lean hog.
Since the value of hogs is largely deter-
mined by genetics and weight of hogs re-
ceived, the use of long-term contracts by the
packer, which specify these characteristics,
may help reduce measurement and sorting
costs. As the costs of measuring quality attri-
butes of hogs increase, the cost of monitoring
contractual performance in long-term con-
tracts also increases. This increases the incen-
tive for vertical integration, as opposed to
long-term contracts.
Hennessy presents a model demonstrating
that inaccuracies in measuring the quality of
an intermediate agricultural product create in-
centives for contracts or vertical integration. If
information asymmetries exist between pro-
ducers and processors regarding the quality of
the intermediate product, testing is required by
the processor to determine the appropriate pre-
mium. Inaccuracies in testing of product qual-
ity reduce the incentive for producers to invest
in assets that improve quality (e.g., genetic
stock, technical education, harvesting and
storage equipment, etc.). Contracts and verti-
cal integration and production contracts solve
the problem by removing the need to test for
quality, thereby improving the quality of the
intermediate input.
Asset Specificity
Another incentive for vertical contracting and
vertical integration may be created by the use of
specific assets in the production process of in-
termediate goods (KIein, Crawford, and AIchi-
an). Specific assets are assets whose value is
much greater in a particular use compared to the
next-best alternative (Milgrom and Roberts). A
specific asset may be physical (unique physical
characteristics), human (unique skills), or site
(unique location) specific capital.
Klein, Crawford, and Alchian suggest that
specific assets may generate quasi-rent
streams, where quasi-rents are defined as the
value of the asset in excess of the salvage val-
ue (i.e., next-best alternative use). These qua-
si-rents may be appropriated through the op-
portunistic behavior of others. For example, an
individual contemplating investment in a spe-
cific asset may agree to exchange with another
party at prices that will ensure the owner re-
ceives some level of quasi-rent from the spe-
cific asset. Once the investment is made, the
second party may then renege on the agree-
ment by offering a lower price. The owner
may be forced to accept the offer, as long as
the price is more favorable than could be ob-
tained in the next-best alternative use.
Long-term contracts and vertical integra-
tion serve to protect individuals from oppor-
tunism by trading partners. A large number of
studies have found that as the level of appro-
priable quasi-rents increases, the use of long-
term contracts and vertical integration increas-
es (see Shelanski and Klein for a review of the
literature).
The use of long-term marketing agree-
ments may serve to reduce the potential for
opportunism in the development of pork prod-
ucts with unique quality characteristics. For
example, PSE pork is lower in quality and
highly related to the “stress gene.” The Na-
tional Pork Producers Council (NPPC) esti-
mates that PSE costs packers $3.29 per hog,
with PSE affecting over 10% of U.S. hogs
(Morgan et al.). Packers may reduce these
costs by offering premiums to hog producers
who use genetic lines that are free of the
“stress gene. ” Carcass merit pricing schemes
used in spot markets offer no premiums for
hogs bred from genetic lines that are free of
the “stress gene. ” In order to receive premi-
ums, hog producers may need to make sub-
stantial investments in “stress gene” free




Figure 1. Net effect at the retail stage of in-
creased vertical coordination of the pork pro-
duction and packing stages
the investment is in place, the premium over
the spot market price becomes a quasi-rent
that can be appropriated to the packer. If the
packer lowers the premium offered, the pro-
ducer is left with the alternative of accepting
the reduced premium or selling in the spot
market for no premium at all. A legally en-
forceable long-term contract with specific
quality provisions provides protection against
short-term opportunism. As the level of appro-
priable quasi-rents increases, the likelihood of
vertical integration increases because there is
a greater one-time benefit of reneging on a
long-term contract.2
Price, Quanti@, and Economic Surplus
Changes
The expected market impact of reducing trans-
actions costs associated with quality improve-
ments is illustrated in figure 1. At the initial
equilibrium, the retail price is PO and retail
quantity is QO.Now consider packers and pro-
2Other examples of specific assets in the pork in-
dustry include substantial investments necessary to
take advantage of economies of size in hog production
(e.g., feed mills, confinement housing, etc.) and hog
processing (e.g., packing plants, storagefacilities, etc.).
ducers who establish contracts for delivery of
finished hogs, or vertically integrate. Higher
quality hogs, manifested in quality improve-
ments of pork products, shift out the demand
for pork from DOto D, (Unnevehr). Improving
the quality of hogs also reduces slaughter and
processing costs by increasing the productivity
of the hogs. This shifts the retail supply curve
from So to S1.The shifts in supply and demand
result in a new equilibrium at Q~ and PL. The
new equilibrium quantity is unambiguously
larger. The net effect on the retail price is in-
determinant, depending on the elasticities of
supply and demand and on the extent of the
horizontal shift-out in supply and demand. In
figure 1, the shift-out in supply exceeds that
of demand, so that the retail price falls. As-
suming parallel shifts in supply and demand,
there is a consumer surplus gain equal to the
area ABCP1, and a gain to producers equal to
the area P, CDE (Lemieux and Wohlgenant).3
Modeling the Effects of Increased
Coordination
Kilmer and Ward have offered one of the few
frameworks for simulating the effects of in-
creased coordination of the vertical stages of
a competitive marketing system. They hypoth-
esize that when a firm contracts or integrates
to obtain inputs, parameters of the production
function may be altered because of increased
input productivity. This occurs because the in-
put is usable only within a narrow band of
characteristics, such as quality, quantities, and
timing of deliveries, which can be controlled
with greater precision by using non-spot co-
ordinating arrangements. To obtain an aggre-
gate market supply curve in a market consist-
ing of firms that use non-spot exchange
methods and firms that exchange on the open
YThe equivalence of these areasto changes in con-
sumer and producer surplus can be derived using ge-
ometry, assuming parallel shifts in supply and demand.
Producer surplus represents net benefits because the
formula aggregates over alt producers, when only a
fraction of pork may be affected by non-spot coordi-
nating arrangements. Therefore, winners and losers
from non-spot coordinating arrangementsare not sort-
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market [i.e., multiple exchange mechanism
(MEM) market], firm supply curves for the
more productive firms and less productive
firms were summed. The importance of con-
tracting and integration is reflected by the pro-
portion of firms using these methods of coor-
dination. Equilibrium prices and quantities in
the MEM market are then compared to equi-
librium in a market consisting only of spot
market exchanges.
A major weakness of the Kilmer and Ward
framework relates to estimation of parameters
of the production function for firms that con-
tract or integrate. According to Kilmer and
Ward, parameters can be directly estimated in
industries that have undergone changes in ver-
tical coordination, or they can be approximat-
ed using managerial judgment. However, di-
rect estimation would be difficult because it is
unlikely that changing methods of coordina-
tion in the pork industry have been significant
enough to warrant direct estimation. To the ex-
tent that such changes have occurred, it would
be difficult to attribute differences in param-
eter estimates to changing methods of coor-
dination. It is also unlikely that “managerial
judgment” can be used to indicate how a pa-
rameter in a production function changes with
new methods of vertical coordination.
The framework used here differs from that
of Kilmer and Ward in several ways. First, we
account for demand shifts at the retail level
due to food quality improvements. Second,
Kilmer and Ward focused on farm-stage ef-
fects, whereas we additionally examine effects
at the retail level, since changing methods of
coordination can have important implications
for consumers as well. Finally, we use per-
centage of hog sales through contract produc-
tion or vertical integration to reflect their im-
portance in the pork industry, instead of the
proportion of firms that use these arrange-
ments. This is because firms can use several
methods of coordination at the same time.
To evaluate the price and quantity effects
of increases in vertical coordination between
the hog production and packing stages, we use
the modeling framework developed by the Na-
tional Pork Producers Council, Agricultural
Education and Consulting Team (Sonka,
Doehring, and Hofing). The NPPC model is a
comparative statics model with two inputs
(hogs and marketing services) and one product
(pork), consisting of three competitive stages
(retail, marketing, and farm). Hog quality im-
provements resulting from increased coordi-
nation are represented in the modeling frame-
work as a shift in supply and demand. We
follow the methodology used by Sonka,
Doehring, and Hofing for estimating supply
and demand shifts related to improved pork
quality. We estimated shifts in retail demand
related to increased leanness, and shifts in re-
tail supply related to increased leanness, and
lower hog acquisition costs. Reduction in the
“fatness” attribute was examined because
more information exists regarding consumer
preferences for leaner pork compared to other
quality attributes, such as PSE (Sonka, Doehr-
ing, and Hofing).
Vertical Coordination and Improved
Leanness
The relationship between non-spot coordinat-
ing arrangements (i.e, contracts and vertical
integration) and reductions in fat is inferred
using survey results and firm-level cases. In a
1993 survey of the 19 largest pork packers,
each was asked to give primary reasons for
using long-term contracts (Hayenga et al,).
Seven of the 10 respondents ranked improved
quality as the most significant reason. In ad-
dition, half of all long-term contracts between
the large packers and large hog producers in-
cluded minimum quality or genetics require-
ments.
Smithfield Foods, a leading packer in the
pork industry, emphasizes the importance of
long-term contracts and vertical integration in
obtaining consistent supplies of lean, high
quality hogs (Smithfield Foods, Inc.). In fiscal
year 1996, it obtained approximately 61% of
its hogs through long-term agreements and in-
tegrated operations. Smithfield Foods touts its
National Pig Development (NPD) program as
the best demonstration of the effects of a high-
ly coordinated operation. Through Srnithfield-
Carroll’s, a joint hog production operation
with a major North Carolina hog producer,306 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1998





Packer Defect ($/head) (%)
Backfat thickness 2.80 100
Degree of ham and
butttrimming 1.87 100
Excessive seam fat 0.63 100
Bellies too fat or
too thin 0.14 100
Weight problems 0.88 100
Total packer costs 6.32
Source: Sonka,Doehring,and Hofing.
Carroll’s Foods, Smithfield Foods has long-
term contracts with Carroll’s and its affiliates
to raise hogs. Smithfield-Carroll’s also ob-
tained exclusive rights to develop and market
the NPD breed of hog. This breed produces
the leanest hog in U.S. commercial production
and one of the leanest meats of any kind, in-
cluding chicken. Nutritional studies in 1996
indicated that NPD pork is 34~o to 6190 leaner
than that of non-NPD pork, depending on the
cut. Other packers using non-spot coordinating
arrangements include Farmland Foods and Ex-
cel, who offer contracts with specific require-
ments regarding leanness (Freese, Fee, and
Looker).
Supply Shifis
Sonka, Doehring, and Hofing estimated that
packers could save $6.32 per head by slaugh-
tering a hog that is approximately 199Z0 leaner
than average (table 1).4 Because packer costs
associated with leanness problems were re-
ported to be controlled at the farm stage (e.g.,
through genetics), these cost savings could be
realized by increased coordination between the
4Thispercentagereductionwascalculatedby com-
paringa weightedaverageof backfatdepthfor packers
in the survey and comparing it to the mid-point of the
optimal backfat depth range of 0,8 to 1.0 inch. Specific
assumptions regarding the weight of the leaner hogs
are not necessary to estimate the shifts in supply due
to packer cost savings.
producer and packer. Coordination via con-
tracts or integration can serve to improve the
quality of hogs slaughtered by reducing mea-
suring and sorting costs or by reducing op-
portunism associated with investments in spe-
cific breeding stock. Smithfield Foods’ NPD
program suggests that a 199Z0 reduction in fat
from increasing vertical control through con-
tracting or integration is realistic.
To estimate the shift in the retail supply
curve associated with the production of leaner
hogs, the $6.32 per head cost reduction is first
multiplied by the average number of U.S. fed-
erally inspected barrows and gilts slaughtered
from 1993–95 (89.7 million head) [U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture (USDA), Livestock
Slaughter]. Dividing this cost of excess fat
($567 million) by average total marketing
costs of $19.8 billion5—which include costs
such as slaughtering and processing, transpor-
tation, and cutting and merchandising—gives
potential marketing cost savings of 2.86%.
Assuming that increased leanness is
achieved through contracting and integration,
another potential source of cost savings is hog
acquisition costs. These costs include operat-
ing buying stations, paying salaried or com-
missioned buying agents, and transporting
hogs to packing facilities. Recently, Thorn
Apple Valley entered into an agreement with
the Michigan Livestock Exchange (MLE) to
manage the company’s buying stations and to
supply the quantity and quality of hogs spec-
ified by Thorn Apple Valley. Thorn Apple
Valley pays MLE $83,333 a month plus
MLE’s hog costs to supply approximately 2.1
5The average of total marketing costs from 1993–
95 was calculated by first estimating average farm rev-
enue over the same period. Average farm revenue
($1O.3 billion) was calculated by multiplying average
quantity of pork sold (liveweight billion pounds;
USDA, Meat Animals—Production, Disposition, and
Income) by average farm price ($/pound; USDA, Hog
Outlook). Average consumer expenditures ($30. 1 bil-
lion) were then estimated by dividing average farm
revenue by the average cost shareof farm inputs (0.34,
net farm value as a percent of retail price; USDA, Hog
Outlook). That is, consumer expenditures are 1/0.34
times higher than farm revenue. Average marketing
costs ($19.8 billion) are then calculated by subtracting
average farm revenue from average consumption ex-
penditures.Martinez, Smith, and Zering: Vertical Coordination in the pork Industry 307
million hogs per year (Martinez, Smith, and
Zering). This results in a cost of $.48 per hog
for acquisitions (not including transportation
or buying station facilities costs). Packers pro-
ducing their own hogs, or using long-term
contracts, do not incur this buying station
management fee.
U.S. hog slaughter of 89.7 million head,
together with a $.48 per hog reduction in buy-
ing agent costs, suggests that hog acquisition
cost savings ($.48 X 89.7 million head = $43
million) as a percentage of total marketing
costs ($19.8 billion) are 0,22%.6 Adding this
to packer cost reductions due to increased
leanness, the net percentage change in margin-
al cost is – (2.86 + 0.22)a = –3.08a, where
a is the percentage of market hog sales
through long-term contracting and vertically
integrated operations. Percentage shifts are ad-
justed down to reflect the degree of contract-
ing and integration in the hog industry. A sim-
ilar approach was used by Lernieux and
Wohlgenant to reflect adoption rates of a
growth hormone.
Demand Shi#s
The shift in the demand for pork arising from
a 19% reduction in fat is calculated using con-
sumer premiums placed on leaner pork. Be-
cause an estimate of consumers’ value of lea-
ner pork could not be located,’ the premium
placed on 19% leaner pork was derived using
consumers’ willingness to pay for 1O% leaner
pork. Lemieux and Wohlgenant used survey
data to estimate consumers’ willingness to pay
for 10% leaner pork that is produced by a
growth hormone. They found that mean will-
ingness to pay for this 10% leaner pork was
4.3% of the retail price. Using a linear inter-
polation of consumers’ willingness to pay for
1096 leaner pork, we estimate that consumers’
6Although moves to contracting or integrationmay
not benefit Thorn Apple Valley specifically, these costs
do provide documentable evidence of acquisition costs
for open market purchases.
7Although available evidence suggests a negative
relationship between fat (backfat and seam fat) in beef
cuts and prices at retail (Unnevehr and Bard), similar
detailed studies for pork could not be located.
willingness to pay for 19?loleaner pork is 8.2%
of the retail price of pork.8 Assuming that the
willingness to pay for leaner pork applies only
to fresh pork, which comprises 25% of total
pork consumption (Sonka, Doehring, and Hof-
ing), the percentage demand shift is estimated
to be 2.OW(i.e., 8.2 X 0.25a), where a reflects
the degree of contracting and integration.
We use three estimates of the degree of
contracting and integration in the pork indus-
try. Hayenga et al. surveyed 19 large packers
in 1994, accounting for 8670 of U.S. hog
slaughter in 1993. Their results indicated that
contracting and integration accounted for
about 13% of their market hog transactions in
1993, and were projected to increase to 3490
by 1998. Assuming that packers who were ex-
cluded from the survey (14% of U.S. slaugh-
ter) did not procure their hogs using these ar-
rangements, then on a national basis these
arrangements accounted for about 11% (0.86
x O.13) of U.S. packers’ supply, with 1998
projections to 29% (0.86 X 0.34). For com-
parison, simulations also are provided for the
case where 1009o of hogs are transferred
through contracts and integrated operations.
Results
Changes in prices and quantities from in-
creased coordination considered in our analy-
sis are presented for nine scenarios. Given the
uncertainty underlying consumers’ willingness
to pay for leaner pork, we assume three values
for the demand shift. First, we assume that
there is no quality-induced demand shift due
to increased coordination. Second, the willing-
ness-to-pay estimate is applied only to fresh
pork. Third, we assume that the premium
placed on leaner pork applies to both fresh and
8This estimate is based on consumers’ willingness
to pay for leaner pork produced from a growth hor-
mone at a particukw point in time. Consumers’ will-
ingness to pay for leaner pork may vary for leanness
obtained through genetic advances, or over time as
consumer preferences change.308 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1998
Table 2. Changes in Pork Prices and Quantities from Increased Coordination of Production
and Packing Stages
11% Contracting 29910Contracting 100% Contracting
Length
or Integration or Integration or Integration
of No Low High No Low High No Low High
Variable Run Value Value Value Value Value Value Value Value Value













–0.2 –0.1 o –0.5 –0.4
–0.2 –0.2 –0.1 –0.6 –0.05
–0.2 –0.2 –0.2 –0.6 –0.6
0.1 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.6
0.1 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.7
0.1 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.8
0.1 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.7
0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3
0 0 0 00
0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3
0.1 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.5
0.1 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.6
0.1 –1.8 –1.2 0,4
–0.3 –1,9 –1.7 –1,1
–0.6 –2.0 –2.0 –2.0
1.5 1.2 2.1 5.1
1.8 1.3 2.5 6.1
1.9 1.3 2.6 6.6
2.0 0.7 2.3 7.0
0.8 0.3 0.9 2.6
0 0 0 0
0.8 0.3 0.9 2.8
1.4 0.5 1.6 4.7
1.7 0.6 1.9 5.9
Notes: SR refersto the short run (one-year adjustment),IR refers to the intermediate run (five-year adjustment), and
LR refers to the long run (when supply elasticity of hogs is infinite). For the “no value” scenario, no demand shift is
assumed. For the “low value” scenario, consumer willingness to pay for leaner pork is applied only to fresh pork,
which implies a shift in consumer demand of 270. For the “high value” scenario, consumer willingness to pay for
learrer pork is applied to all pork, implying an 8.2% shift in consumer demand for pork. In each scenario, supply and
demand shifts are applied only tothe percentage of slaughter hogs procured through long-term contracts or integrated
operations.
processed pork. 9 For each of the demand
shifts, we generate results for three degrees of
contracting and integration. Parameter values
used in the simulations are presented in ap-
pendix table Al.
Effects of increases in coordination that re-
sult in improved leanness are presented in table
2 for three lengths of run, depending on the elas-
ticity of hog supply. There is a tendency for
retail prices to fall, hog prices to rise, and pro-
duction and consumption quantities to rise.
Changes in prices and quantities are magnified
as the percentage of hogs obtained through con-
tracts and vertical integration increases. The
shift in demand due to leaner pork moderates
the reduction in retail price that results from
gAccounting for other quality attributes, such as
reduction in PSE, would have the same directional ef-
fect on the size of the demand shift as applying the
premium to a larger proportion of pork. In this way,
applying the premium to both processed and freshpork
can be used to represent a higher willingness to pay
for higher quality pork.
marketing cost reductions. The greater the value
placed on leaner pork, the less the reduction in
retail price and the greater the increase in hog
price. Over a one-year period, the retail price
increases when the demand shift is greatest.
Price changes, however, become less sensitive
to demand shifts over time as hog production
and consumption rise.
These results suggest that significant ben-
efits to producers and consumers occur
through increased coordination between hog
producers and packers. Changes in consumers’
and producers’ surplus are presented in table
3. Consumers’ surplus increases over time,
while producers’ surplus declines. Increases in
consumers’ surplus range from $60 million to
$3.2 billion because of increases in coordina-
tion to improve leanness. Producers’ surplus
is estimated to increase from $8 million to
$706 million in the first year, and between $3
million and $270 million within a five-year
period. These surplus changes compare to $30
billion in average total consumer expendituresMartinez, Smith, and Zering: Vertical Coordination in the Pork Industry 309
Table 3. Changes in Consumers’ Surplus (as a percentage of pork expenditures) and Producers’
Surplus (as a percentage of farm revenue) from Increased Coordination of Production and
Packing Stages
1170 Contracting 29% Contracting 100?40Contracting
Length
or Integration or Integration or Integration
of No Low High No Low High NO Low High
Variable Run Value Vahte Value Value Value Value Value Value Value
------------------------- Percent -------------------------
Consumers’ Surplus SR 0.2 0.4 0.9 0,5 1.0 2.3 1.8 3,3 8.0
IR 0.2 0.4 1,0 0.6 1.1 2.8 1.9 3.8 9.6
LR 0.2 0.5 1,1 0.6 1,2 3.0 2.0 4,1 10.6
Producers’ Surplus SR 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.7 2.0 0.7 2.3 7.1
IR O 0.1 0.3 0,1 0.3 0.8 0.3 0,9 2,7
LR O 0 0 000 00 0
Note: See footnote to table 2,
on pork from 1993–95, and $10 billion in av-
erage farm revenue from hog production over
the same period. Resulting changes in con-
sumers’ and producers’ surplus appear to be
sensitive to both the percentage of hogs ob-
tained through contracts and vertical integra-
tion, and the shift in demand due to the pro-
duction of leaner pork.
Limitations
Our ability to formally test the hypotheses re-
garding motives for contracting and integra-
tion was limited by a dearth of published in-
formation in several areas. Published
firm-level data on contracting and integration,
quality of plant slaughter output, and unifor-
mity of hogs and pork products are sporadic,
at best. The authors also are not aware of pub-
lished output quality information for packers.
Costs associated with contracting and integra-
tion were excluded because of the difficulty in
obtaining this information, Including these
costs would moderate the downward shift in
the retail supply curve. 10In addition, infor-
mation on consistency of size and quality, and
its effect on slaughter costs and returns would
provide more accurate assessments.
10 Because contracts are long term and between
larger producers and packers, costs of negotiating and
renegotiating contracts are reduced.
Estimating pork price and consumption ef-
fects of higher quality products is further com-
plicated by the considerable uncertainty sur-
rounding consumer valuation of pork quality
attributes.For example, there is still little known
about how consumers value leaner pork. This
information can be assessed in several ways,
Detailed price, quantity, and quality data are re-
quired to estimate hedonic demand functions for
products of various levels of quality. Unnevehr
and Bard directly estimated values of various
types of fat in several cuts of beef using data
from the National Beef Market Basket Survey.
They found that external fat reduced value,
while the effect of marbling was positive in
some cuts and negative in others. In the absence
of such data, researchers have used willingness-
to-pay data to estimate the relative value of
products of various levels of quality. Willing-
ness-to-pay data usually are elicited by offering
various qualities of similar products to individ-
uals and asking them to state how much they
would pay for one versus another. Estimation
problems are exacerbated by the fact that “qual-
ity” may be defined by several traitsratherthan
just one. Collection of willingness-to-pay data is
expensive, and the cost increases rapidly with
the number of variables being evaluated. Wlll-
ingness-to-pay data are useful in estimating the
direction and scale of consumers’ preference,
but extrapolation and assumptions are required
to predict overall demand shifts.310 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1998
Conclusions
The effects of contracting and integration on
consumers and producers ultimately will de-
pend on the motives for these arrangements.
Transactions costs economics suggests that
contracts and integration may serve to im-
prove product quality in two ways. First, mea-
suring and sorting costs associated with ob-
taining a uniform supply of high quality hogs
for slaughter may be reduced. Second, oppor-
tunism associated with breeding stock for pro-
ducing high quality hogs may be alleviated.
A framework was developed for assessing
the effects of quality improvements due to
new coordinating methods. It was then applied
using the quality attribute “leanness.” Signif-
icant benefits to producers and consumers can
be obtained by increases in coordination be-
tween producers and packers that result in
leaner hogs and pork products. Considering
other attributes besides leanness could result
in even greater benefits.
Potential benefits of contractual arrange-
ments and integration, motivated by efforts to
improve product quality, should be considered
in legislative decisions regarding market pow-
er. Pork price increases at retail are not nec-
essarily indicative of anticompetitive behavior.
Demand shifts due to food quality improve-
ments can result in higher retail prices, de-
pending on the extent of quality improvements
and the value placed on quality attributes.
Additional information is needed to more
formally link changing methods of coordi-
nation to hog quality improvements, and link
hog quality improvements to cost reductions
throughout the marketing system. Possibili-
ties for measuring quality effects of in-
creased coordination include: a multi-firm
study for a single industry, where quality of
product is compared to degree of coordina-
tion; and a multi-industry study where
change in product price and quality over
time are compared to the degree of coordi-
nation in each industry.
Data and methodological problems include
finding an appropriate definition of quality and
obtaining cost and quality information that is
proprietary in nature. One possibility is to un-
dertake research projects with cooperatives,
such as Farmland, or private firms, without
identifying participants. Another alternative is
to conduct industry-sponsored studies where
firms may be more willing to participate with
the intent of improving overall standards and
competitiveness in the industry. Packer sur-
veys, such as that conducted for the National
Pork Producers Council (Morgan et al.), are
steps in the right direction for developing a
better understanding of the cost effects of
quality improvements that result from increas-
es in vertical coordination. For multi-industry
studies, the challenge is to obtain comparable
measures of quality and costs.
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Table Al. Parameter Values for the U.S. Pork Industry
Parameters Values
Elasticity of demand at retail –0.65’
Elasticity of supply of hogs 0.40, 1.8, WI
Elasticity of substitution 0.35’
Farm operator’s cost share o.34b
Cost share of marketing input o.66b
Decrease in marketing costs’ –0.34, –0.90, –3.08
Increase in retail demand priced 0,0,0.0, 0.0; or 0.23,0.60, 2.0; or 0.91, 2.39, 8.2
Consumer expenditures $30.1 billion’
“ Source: Lemieux and Wohlgenant.
bSource: USDA, Hog Outlook.
cPercentagechangein costs of – 3.08’% is multipliedby 0.11, 0.29, and 1.0, which correspond to three percentages of
market hogs procured through non-spot arrangements.
dFor the first three values, no demand shift is assumed. For the next three values, percentage change in consumer
demand for pork of 2% is multiplied by 0.11, 0.29, and 1,0, which correspond to three percentages of market hogs
procured through non-spot arrangements. For the final three values, percentage change in consumer demand for pork
of 8.2% is multiplied by 0.11, 0.29, and 1.0.
eSee text footnote 5 for derivation.